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The Rising Price of Physicians' Services: A Clarification
Abstract
Several years ago, one of us presented a model of the market for physicians' services (Feldstein, 1970). In a
subsequent comment, Brown and Lapan ( 1972) raised several questions about the model and the
conclusions. Unfortunately, this comment and the reply by Feldstein ( 1972) left a number of issues unsettled.
Some of the disagreement was based on misunderstanding and on drawing infer ences from different
theoretical models. After the publication of the comment and reply, we continued to pursue the basis of our
disagreements. The cur rent note is an attempt to clarify the issues that were raised but not resolved in the
previous ex change.
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 FIGURE 3. - a= 1
 and, from (18) and (29),
 2q2 A - W
 2gq2 W + eT=O. (31)
 2gq2
 In this case the L"' 0 locus is given by
 L' = (32)
 g
 This is drawn in figure 3 on the assumption that
 A > B.
 III. Summary
 In the context of a cost of adjustment model it
 has been shown that the conditions for inter-
 temporal maximization do not restrict the value
 of a, the returns to labour parameter, to be in any
 particular range. However, different ranges of
 values of a do have implications for the existence
 of equilibria and admissible employment paths. In
 particular, under certain simplifying assumptions,
 the only equilibrium in the range 0 < a < 2 was
 located in the subinterval 1 < a < 2 and was seen
 to be unstable.
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 THE RISING PRICE OF PHYSICIANS' SERVICES: A CLARIFICATION
 Douglas Brown, Martin Feldstein and Harvey Lapan
 Several years ago, one of us presented a model
 of the market for physicians' services (Feldstein,
 1970). In a subsequent comment, Brown and Lapan
 (1972) raised several questions about the model
 and the conclusions. Unfortunately, this comment
 and the reply by Feldstein (1972) left a number of
 issues unsettled. Some of the disagreement was
 based on misunderstanding and on drawing infer-
 ences from different theoretical models. After the
 publication of the comment and reply, we continued
 to pursue the basis of our disagreements. The cur-
 rent note is an attempt to clarify the issues that
 were raised but not resolved in the previous ex-
 change.
 The behavior of the market for physicians' ser-
 vices is still an important issue. Physicians (and
 other health care providers) have been singled out
 for special and detailed controls under the several
 phases of the price control program that came into
 effect in 1971. The prospect of rapid inflation of
 physicians' fees continues to be a subject of concern
 and the complaint of shortage grows louder. To deal
 appropriately with these issues, and to protAe
 suitable analysis of alternative proposals for na-
 tional health insurance, requires a quantitative
 model of the market for physicians' services.
 I. The Demand for Physicians' Services
 Feldstein (1970) presented estimates of several
 alternative static and dynamic equations for the
 Received for publication September 26, 1973. Revision
 accepted for publication October 9, 1973.
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 demand for physicians' services. The estimated elas-
 ticity of quantity demanded with respect to net
 price (i.e., price net of insurance) was always posi-
 tive. Feldstein concluded from this and other fea-
 tures of the parameter estimates that the observed
 prices and quantities are not points on the demand
 function, and that the market does not follow a
 Marshallian or Walrasian process of adjustment to
 remove excess demand. In contrast, Brown and
 Lapan (1972) argued that the evidence of a positive
 elasticity with respect to net price does not estab-
 lish the existence of excess demand.
 We now agree that, because of the composite na-
 ture of the net price variable, it is possible to obtain
 a positive demand elasticity even if there is no
 excess demand. The "net price" is an average of
 the prices paid by the uninsured and by the in-
 sured. The price paid by the insured reflects both
 the gross price charged by physicians and the
 percentage of the bill paid by insurance. An in-
 crease in the gross price with insurance unchanged
 would raise the net price to both the insured and
 the uninsured and should reduce demand. Similarly,
 an increase in the extent of insurance coverage
 would lower the net price to the insured while not
 changing the net price to the uninsured; this fall
 in overall net price should increase demand. How-
 ever, a simultaneous increase in both the gross
 price and the extent of insurance coverage has an
 indeterminate effect. For the uninsured, there is
 an unambiguous decrease in demand; for the in-
 sured, the increase in coverage can more than offset
 the increase in gross price, leading to a fall in net
 price and an increase in demand. If the fall in net
 price to the insured is greater than the increase in
 gross price to the uninsured, the overall net price
 will fall. If there are no restrictions on the relative
 sizes of the price elasticities of the insured and
 uninsured, the reduction in demand by the unin-
 sured could be the dominant effect. A fall in overall
 net price would then be accompanied by a fall in
 total demand.
 This example shows that the positive elasticity
 with respect to net price can be reconciled with tra-
 ditional demand behavior and a market in which
 supply and demand are equal in every period.
 However, Feldstein (1970) presented equations
 with separate variables for price and for insurance;
 the insurance variable always had the wrong (nega-
 tive) sign. Models of lagged price adjustment also
 implied anomalous coefficients, indicating that the
 positive price elasticity did not reflect the applica-
 tion of a static model to a dynamic process. In a
 different approach to avoiding the composite net
 *price variable, Brown and Lapan (1972) estimated
 a variety of separate demand equations for i sured
 persons and uninsured persons. Here again the es-
 timated price elasticities were generally positive.
 In short, a positive demand elasticity is consistent
 with either a clearing market or excess demand.
 The additional evidence that we have presented,
 however, points in the direction of excess demand.
 Because the analysis is based on a small sample of
 aggregate time series, any such inference must be
 regarded as tentative.' It indicates the need for
 additional research on this market and suggests that
 policies in this area should not be developed with-
 out considering the implications of a market with
 chronic excess demand.
 II. The Supply of Physicians' Services
 The models of the supply of physicians' services
 presented by Feldstein and by Brown and Lapan
 differ in a small but important way. Feldstein
 related the supply of services per physician to the
 price charged by physicians, the consumer price
 index, the quantity of inputs used in the physicians'
 practices, and other variables. The specification of
 Brown and Lapan differs from this primarily by
 using the price of the inputs used in the physicians'
 practices rather than the quantity. In Feldstein's
 model, a change in the output of physicians' ser-
 vices implies that the physicians' own labor has
 changed in the same direction. In the Brown-Lapan
 model, a change in the output of physicians' services
 is the net effect of changes in physicians' labor and
 in their use of inputs. The comment and the reply
 failed to indicate that much of the apparent dis-
 agreement about the appropriate signs of parameters
 was due to this difference in the models.
 The key result in Feldstein's analysis is that an
 increase in the average gross price causes a reduc-
 tion in the quantity of physicians' services that is
 provided. Because the quantity of inputs is included
 in the equation, the evidence implies that the sup-
 ply curve of the physicians' own labor is negatively
 sloped. In contrast, Brown and Lapan found that
 an increase in the average gross price causes an
 increase in the quantity of physicians' services.
 The two sets of results are easily reconciled. The
 estimates of Brown and Lapan imply that a rise in
 fees induces doctors to increase the use of inputs by
 more than enough to offset the reduction in their
 own labor supply. The industry supply curve ap-
 pears positively sloped even though the supply
 of physicians' own labor is negatively sloped.2
 1 A different issue about the interpretation of the positive
 price elasticity is raised by Fuchs and Kramer (1972); on
 this point see Feldstein (1973).
 2 Within the context of the Brown-Lapan model, the
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 TABLE 1. BROWN AND LAPAN MODEL OF THE-SUPPLY-OF PHYSICIANS' SERVICES
 Equation CP AP CPI R GIPhys t log t YeR 1R
 1 3.60 2.69 -2.45 -0.103 -0.64 .97
 (1.32) (0.77) (0.79) (0.023) (0.19)
 2 0.10 1.36 -0.92 -0.07 0.31 .99
 (0.06) (0.49) (0.50) (0.02) (0.05)
 3 0.04 2.38 -3.09 -0.14 -0.001 .98
 (0.10) (0.86) (0.62) (0.03) (0.018)
 4 -0.02 1 0.99 -0.32 -0.10 0.35 0.55 .99
 (0.014) (0.53) (0.23) (0.03) (0.03) (0.40)
 5 0.08 1.27 -0.90 -0.08 0.31 0.22 .99
 (0.07) (0.53) (0.52) (0.02) (0.06) (0.45)
 The dependent variable is services per physician. The independent variables are: CP customary price; AP = average price; R = index
 of input prices; GIPhys = government health services per physician; t = time; YBe. = reference income. All variables are in logarithms. Equa-
 tions are estimated for 1948-1966. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
 The supply elasticity in the Brown-Lapan model
 generally remains positive when the definition of
 price is altered and a measure of "reference income"
 is included. However, the actual parameter esti-
 mates are quite sensitive to the choice of specifica-
 tion. Table 1 shows that the elasticity of supply
 with respect to "customary price" (CP) is 3.60.
 Substituting "averaging price" (AP) lowers the
 elasticity to 0.10 and renders it insignificant (equa-
 tion 2). An alternative specification of the time
 trend (equation 3) raises this elasticity to 0.40, now
 significantly different from zero. Adding the "ref-
 erence income" (YRef) variable to the initial speci-
 fication introduces such collinearity that four of
 the six variables, including price, become insignifi-
 cant (equation 4). The result is similar in equation
 5 where average price is used.
 The choice between the two models is difficult.
 Unfortunately, neither the price data nor the quan-
 tity data are good enough to permit rigorous test-
 ing.3 We hope that the problems raised by our
 analysis will induce others to use new and richer
 bodies of data to examine the supply behavior of
 physicians and the effect of changes in fees on their
 demand for inputs.4
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 2-7, 1973, Tokyo. positive elasticities with respect to both the price of physi-
 cians' services and the CPI can also be reconciled. A
 higher CPI increases physician effort while a higher price
 decreases physician effort but increases the input of other
 factors.
 3 Feldstein chose to use the quantity of inputs because
 he believed the data were better and was most interested
 in the physicians' supply of their own labor. Brown and
 Lapan used the price of inputs because it is a predetermined
 variable to the physician and because they were interested
 in the total supply of physicians' services.
 4 The recent studies of Fuchs and Kramer (1972), Rein-
 hardt (1972) and Sloan (1973) provide useful analysis of
 physicians' behavior and of input demand but do not show
 the effects of changes in fees when input prices are held
 constant.
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